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In the past decade, African countries have played an active role in the reform of international
investment regime. This is reflected in the increased negotiation of the so-called "new generation" of
investment treaties and a slow move away from the European-style lean model bilateral investment
treaty ( BIT). This article examines the Morocco–Nigeria BIT 2016 which contains a number of
innovative features including an emphasis on sustainable development, the inclusion of investor
obligations, a joint committee and express protection of the host state’s regulatory discretion. This
article highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of the BIT but also future challenges. This article
will inform policy-makers and academics on the innovative features of the Morocco–Nigeria BIT as
well as its conceptual and practical challenges.
Introduction
Since the advent of the modern system of international investment protection in the mid-20th century,
the participation of African countries in the development of international investment law has been
poor. However, since the dawn of the 21st century, the international investment regime has
experienced unprecedented turbulence caused by the increased dissatisfaction with investor–state
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms and traditional standards of protecting foreign investment.1
While all forms of international investment agreements (IIAs) have *I.C.C.L.R. 70 experienced
turbulence, the large network of BITs has been at the centre of this criticism.2 Dissatisfaction with the
traditional BITs has generated four main types of reactions: (1) the termination of BITs and the
adoption of investment legislation (for example, the South Africa Protection of Investment Act 2015)3;
(2) the increased concluding of facilitation agreements without recourse to international investment
arbitration and the exclusion of most substantive foreign investment protection standards (for
example, the Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) between Brazil and
Mozambique)4; (3) an increased reluctance to ratify BITs, with fewer agreements coming into force in
past decade5; and (4) countries moving away from the traditional European-style lean model BIT
towards a "new generation" of BITs that aim to strike a balance between private investors’ interests
and national public policy.6 The recently concluded BIT between Morocco and Nigeria, not yet in
force, is a canonical example of this last typology.
On 3 December 2016, Morocco and Nigeria concluded a bilateral agreement with the overarching aim
of strengthening "the bonds of friendship and cooperation" between the two states.7 The agreement is
an important attempt by two developing countries to move towards a new generation of BITs which
aligns with the evolution of international investment law. In fact, the BIT contains several innovative
features designed to address the criticisms levied towards the international investment regime. The
BIT takes a modern approach to the balance of rights and obligations between investors and the
respective host states by placing emphasis on: the promotion of sustainable development, limits and
clarification to the substantive investment protection provisions and treaty obligations on investors
and safeguards to the state’s discretion to take measures to meet policy objectives.8
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The underlying aim of this article is to examine the innovative features of the BIT and their practical
application. In order to achieve the goal of this article, first and foremost the reform agenda in Africa is
highlighted in order to determine the motivations behind the reform. Secondly, specific provisions that
represent a *I.C.C.L.R. 71 departure from the traditional BIT are critically examined. Finally, a
conclusion that ties together the various arguments throughout this article is provided.
Motivation behind the Morocco–Nigeria BIT
The motivation behind the Morocco–Nigeria BIT is to strengthen business relationships through a
bilateral agreement that facilitates investment in the two states. Leading up to the BIT, a Joint
Initiative on the Morocco–Nigeria Gas Regional Pipeline, dubbed the "the Wonder of Africa" because
it was purely African-led, was under negotiation.9 The project was estimated to have a direct impact
on 300 million people and the potential to support and speed up electrification projects in West Africa,
therefore serving as a platform for the creation of a competitive electricity market in the region. This
was followed by a second initiative to maximise fertiliser production, thereby creating thousands of
jobs, reinforcing distribution channels and reinvigorating the regional market for fertilisers. The two
projects were the main drivers behind the BIT and its innovative features directly reflect the nature of
these negotiations. The fact that it was an intra-African BIT designed to support projects led purely by
African investors explains this deviation from the traditional BIT. Without outside influence, both
countries had the discretion to draft a BIT that reflects domestic realities such as the inclusion of pre
and post-investment obligations on foreign investors. Against this background, while the BIT provides
a template and the right impetus for departure from the traditional BIT, it is unlikely that a similar
agreement could be reached with a capital exporting developed state, which is likely to dominate the
negotiation process.
Departure from the traditional BIT is driven not only by increased commercial activity within Africa,
culminating in intra-African investment agreements, but also by increased calls from the academic
community for Africa to chart a new course that reflects and promotes Africa’s economic interests. For
example, the Journal of World Investment and Trade published a special issue in 2017 that focused
on investment law related developments in Africa.10 The emerging research shows that the
developments in Africa mirror those around the world, from innovative treaty-making practices to
treaty obligations on investors.11 Departure from the traditional BIT is also driven by international
organisations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which
continues to publish relevant statistical information on Africa.12 Thus, the position taken in the
Morocco–Nigeria BIT is not entirely radical but reflects growing international consensus over reform of
the international investment regime consisting of both the substantive rules and the institutional
bodies. This consensus is reflected in the recent denunciation of the Washington Convention on the
*I.C.C.L.R. 72 Settlement of Investment Disputes between Investors and States (ICSID Convention)
13 by Latin American states (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) and the renegotiation of a large number
of traditional BITs by Asian countries such as India and Indonesia.14 This reform activity sends a clear
message that the international investment regime is no longer dominated by capital exporting
(Western Europe and North American) states but, rather, that Asian and African countries have taken
on a more active role in directing its future. Thus, the Morocco–Nigeria BIT is a reflection of the
growing influence of African countries over the international economic order.
Africa’s growing influence is further supported by the emerging role of regions, rather than individual
countries, as drivers of reform in this area, which has helped to strengthen the bargaining power of
individual states. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are co-ordinating and harmonising their Member States’
investment policies in a bid to achieve greater regional economic integration.15 Thus, the new
regionalism in investment governance is shaping the course of not only international investment law
reform but also intra-African investment policies. For example, a number of regional and African
Union (AU) led initiatives are progressively defragmenting investment agreements from a bilateral to a
multilateral model, with the underlying aim of creating an Africa-wide free trade area governed by a
multilateral foreign investment agreement. The Pan-African Investment Code (PAIC) is a product of
this grand scheme to create an integrated continental policy on investment.16 Indeed, the PAIC is a
strategic building block for the proposed Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) with all 55 AU Member
States for the purpose of promoting sustainable development, economic integration and
harmonisation in trade and investment on the continent.17 Although these projects are yet to fully
materialise, they provide the right impetus for the negotiation of Morocco–Nigeria style BITs that
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reflect national interests. However, without the backing of a unified Africa, as promised by the CFTA,
such innovative BITs are likely to remain few and majorly intra-African. Despite that, the innovative
features in the Morocco–Nigeria BIT warrant closer scrutiny. *I.C.C.L.R. 73
The innovative features of the Morocco–Nigeria BIT
Four innovative features of the Morocco–Nigeria BIT are examined below: (1) sustainability and
investor obligations; (2) standards of treatment; (3) dispute settlement provisions; and (4) express
protection of the host state’s regulatory discretion.
Sustainability and investor obligations
Sustainability is the main theme in the BIT, featuring four times in its Preamble and in a number of its
substantive provisions. For example, in the definition of "investment", art.1(3) requires that
investments contribute to sustainable development, although sustainable development is not
expressly included among the characteristics of investment. However, the definition excludes, inter
alia, portfolio investments which are inherently passive and relatively short term. In fact, one of the
objectives of the BIT is to "promote, encourage and increase investment opportunities that enhance
sustainable development". Similarly, art.24(1) obligates investors to "strive to make the maximum
feasible contributions to the sustainable development of the host State and local community"
(Preamble). This is why investors are required to satisfy environmental and social impact assessment
requirements prior to making their investment (art.14).
In addition, art.18(1) requires investors to maintain an environmental management system
post-investment and, in the case of resource exploitation and high-risk industrial enterprises, a current
certification to ISO 14001 or an equivalent environmental management standard is required.
Moreover, investors must comply with international labour standards (such as the International
Labour Organization (ILO) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work),18 human
rights (art.18) and apply corporate social responsibility requirements such as the ILO Tripartite
Declaration on Multinational Investments and Social Policy,19 as well as specific or sectorial standards
of responsible practice (art.24). These obligations are coupled with a relatively broad discretion on the
part of the host state under art.13(4) to take non-discriminatory measures that "it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity … is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
and social concerns".
Taken together, these provisions point towards a more socially responsible form of investment
promotion. They emphasise the prevailing view that, although investment is encouraged, it should not
be at the cost of the long-term environmental and social well-being of the host state. This is further
underlined by the inclusion of a provision for an investor to be subject to civil liability in their home
state for committing damaging acts in the host state (art.20).20 Equally, the BIT requires that investors
and their investments shall never engage or be complicit in corrupt practices that would amount to a
breach of the domestic law of the host state and would be subject to prosecution in the host state,
according to its applicable laws and regulations (art.17(2)–(5)). This is an important provision since
corruption impairs development in host states. It also allows the host state to evade liabilities
*I.C.C.L.R. 74 as seen in Metal-Tech 21 and World Duty Free,22 thus giving investors the necessary
incentive to act in accordance with the law. However, it is not clear whether the anti-corruption
provisions can be interpreted to mean that arbitral tribunals cannot handle the issues of corruption
emanating from the BIT since they are dealt with in the local courts of the host state. Nonetheless,
sustainable development reinforces Africa’s social-economic aspirations as reflected in the
negotiations towards the PAIC and the Principles on International Investment for Sustainable
Development in Africa developed by the African Society of International Law.23 Thus, although
questions on the practicality of the sustainability agenda remain, emphasis on sustainability in the
Morocco–Nigeria BIT captures Africa’s social-economic aspirations and is likely to remain a feature of
the ongoing reform of the international investment regime on the continent.
Standards of treatment
The Morocco–Nigeria BIT requires the host state to "accord to investments treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security" (art.7(1)). The same article notes that fair and equitable treatment includes
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"the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal system of a Party".
The last sentence of this article also mentions full protection and security, which "requires each Party
to provide the level of police protection required under customary international law". Thus, rather than
leaving this requirement open to interpretation, the BIT goes on to clarify that the host state must
accord the US minimum standard of treatment of aliens.24 It means that both fair and equitable
treatment as well as full protection and security will not afford investors any additional protection
beyond the minimum standard provided.
The position taken in the Morocco–Nigeria BIT provides a departure from the traditional approach
found in BITs signed by countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, in
which fair and equitable treatment constitutes a standalone standard of protection. By providing that
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security do not afford investors any additional
protection beyond the minimum standard, the BIT removes any scope for confusion as to whether
they constitute autonomous standards of protection. The BIT also takes a similar approach to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)25 by attempting to clearly define the level of
protection afforded to investors. Eric de Brabandere argues that broad fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security provisions, largely contained in the older BITs, have contributed
*I.C.C.L.R. 75 significantly to the rising number of ISDS cases against African countries.26 This is
supported by global ISDS statistics indicating that a majority of new cases were brought under BITs
pursuant to investment protection standards such as fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security.27 In fact, excluding cases that were settled or otherwise discontinued, dismissed at the
jurisdictional stage or where the tribunal found liability without awarding any damages, 60% of the
cases were decided in favour of the investor.28 Thus, the standard of protection contained in the
Morocco–Nigeria BIT is essentially designed to limit the scope of fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security provisions. However, the effectiveness of such an approach could be affected
by the lack of a clear definition for the minimum standard of treatment.
Furthermore, the national treatment standard in the Morocco–Nigeria BIT applies in "like
circumstances", which are indicated in a non-comprehensive list in art.6(3), and it is also in line with
the US approach.29 In interpreting like circumstances, the BIT follows the generally accepted concept
that national treatment should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and supplemented by a
non-exhaustive list of the circumstances that may go towards determining equivalent measures.
Putting limits to the meaning of like circumstances could be seen as an attempt to take a narrow
approach towards the national treatment standard but be counterbalanced by the non-exhaustive list,
thus leaving the standard open to broader interpretation. The remaining substantive provisions,
including expropriation, transfer of funds and subrogation, largely reflect traditional BIT practice.
Dispute settlement provisions
The rising number of ISDS claims has fuelled the growth of protectionist investment policies designed
to limit investor access to investment arbitration and state exposure to investment claims. However,
as in traditional BITs, the Morocco–Nigeria BIT provides for mandatory settlement of investor–state
disputes (art.27) in addition to state–state disputes (art.28). On the latter, the BIT requires state–state
disputes to be settled before a three-member arbitral tribunal. However, before resorting to arbitration,
the parties "shall strive with good faith and mutual cooperation to reach a fair and quick settlement of
the dispute" (art.28(1)). No timeframe for the amicable settlement of the dispute is provided. On the
other hand, art.27 grants investors access to arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Rules30 or any other tribunal. Thus, the primary arbitration provisions of the BIT are
not particularly unusual. *I.C.C.L.R. 76
However, art.26(1) and (2) provide an innovative yet problematic provision entitled "disputes
prevention", which requires that, before initiating the arbitral procedure, "any dispute between the
Parties [is to] … be assessed through consultations and negotiations by the Joint Committee" subject
to a written request by the home state of the investor. Article 4 provides for the establishment of a
Joint Committee to oversee the administration of the treaty, comprising representatives of the two
states. It is not clear from the BIT how the representatives of the committee will be chosen and the
duration of their tenure and, since only the states can elect who members of the committee will be,
there is concern that the interests of the foreign investors may not be adequately represented.
However, even though art.26 refers only to the "Parties" (i.e. the signatory states), the following
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provisions seem to clarify that the assessment requirement also applies between investors and
states. At this stage of the dispute, representatives of the investor and the host state (or other
competent authorities) are required to participate in a bilateral meeting (art.26(2)). The procedure can
be concluded at the request of any party and with the adoption by the Joint Committee of a report
summarising the position of the parties. And if the dispute is not settled within six months from the
date of the written consultation and negotiation, the investor may resort to international arbitration,
only after exhausting domestic remedies (art.26(5)). Furthermore, art.29 provides for the
consolidation of proceedings which "have a question of law or fact in common and arise out of the
same events or circumstances" (art.28) upon a request by "any disputing party" of two or more claims
submitted separately to arbitration. The procedure for consolidation is to be agreed by the parties
through the Joint Committee.
However, the power to actually refer the disputes to the committee pertains to the state exclusively
and seems to be discretionary, therefore creating a system of espousal where the referral process
depends on the relationship between the investor and the home state. Furthermore, although this
provision aims to better facilitate the amicable resolution of disputes and to reduce the chances of
disputes proceeding to arbitration, all the prescribed steps that parties have to take before initiating
arbitration may actually result in making the process more time consuming and costly.
Other novel dispute settlement provisions include a requirement under art.10(5) for arbitral
proceedings to be transparent and, in particular, the notice of arbitration, the pleadings, memorials,
briefs submitted to the tribunal, written submissions, minutes of transcripts of hearings, orders,
awards and decisions of the tribunal to be made available to the public. The transparency
requirement is, in our view, an impressive and important development since the arbitral tribunal might
assess the regulatory policies and actions of a host state, which could have significant economic and
political consequences to the citizens of that state. It will also minimise the uncertainty and lack of
uniformity in the resolution of investment disputes. Furthermore, the BIT introduces a novel provision
on the liability of investors who
"shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of their home state for the acts or
decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions lead to significant damage,
personal injuries or loss of life in the host state" (art.20). *I.C.C.L.R. 77
However, the host state would be dependent on the home state taking independent action; a measure
which risks contaminating the negotiation process with political motives. It also remains unclear about
who can bring an action against the investor and whether (besides charges of corruption) other
breaches of the obligations can be initiated in the courts of the host state. Overall, the uncertainty left
by the unclear dispute settlement provision is likely to create challenges in the future.
Express protection of the host state’s regulatory discretion
African countries share the same burden and concern as other reform active states, namely that IIAs,
particularly BITs, limit national regulatory space, thereby making it difficult for governments to
discharge their public responsibilities or reverse potentially damaging decisions. This is reflected in
the Morocco–Nigeria BIT which expressly incorporates the right of the host state to regulate or
introduce new measures to meet national policy objectives. Article 23(1) affords the host state
"the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in its territory is consistent
with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and with other legitimate social and
economic policy objectives".
Furthermore, art.13(2) refers to the parties’ right to exercise discretion, as follows:
"[W]ith respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial matters and to make
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental
matters determined to have higher priorities."
Thus, the BIT permits parties to adopt, maintain, or enforce, in a non-discriminatory manner, any
measure otherwise consistent with this agreement that they consider appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in their territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental and social
concerns (art.13(4)).
The Morocco–Nigeria BIT strikes a balance between investor protection and state sovereignty. The
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express inclusion of regulatory discretion is targeted towards addressing the tension between an
investor’s legitimate expectations of stability of the legal framework and the host state’s right to
determine its own legal and economic order. The political transitions in North Africa following the Arab
Spring provide a good example of where a new government might be deterred from reversing the
previous government’s policy decisions owing to fear of investor reprisals.31 These claims operate as
a hindrance to the social, economic and political recovery agenda. The right to stability has produced
classic tribunal decisions such as CMS v Argentina 32 and a recognition in Parkerings v Lithuania that
each state has an "undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power".
*I.C.C.L.R. 78 33
In the Morocco–Nigeria BIT, the host state’s right to regulate is drafted relatively broadly, by reference
to sustainable development and "other legitimate social and economic policy objectives" (art.23(1)).
However, this right is limited by art.23(2), which confirms that it is not absolute and must be exercised
in accordance with international obligations contained in the BIT. Moreover, regulatory powers must
be exercised in accordance with customary international law and the principles of international law
(art.23(2)). Furthermore, in accordance with art.23(3), non-discriminatory measures taken to comply
with international obligations under other treaties do not constitute a breach of the BIT. The BIT
therefore broadly appears to incorporate the approach of previous investment tribunals to this
question. Thus, lack of clarity on whether host states should strictly respect their international
obligations towards foreign investors as contained in investment treaties34 or should strictly respect
their international obligation of persevering public interest issues,35 particularly the environment, will
be significantly minimised by the clear provisions in the BIT.
The future of the Morocco–Nigeria BIT
Having examined the Morocco–Nigeria BIT, it can be concluded that substantive provisions of the
treaty reflect those commonly found in traditional BITs. Once the BIT comes into force, it will be
interesting to observe these innovative features in practice. From the assessment carried out above,
there are three main innovative features found in the Morocco–Nigeria BIT that should be keenly
observed. First, the BIT addresses one of the main sources of criticism towards international
investment law by proving measures for safeguarding national regulatory space. The express
obligation is dependent on the host state exercising its regulatory powers in accordance with
customary international law and the general principles of international law. With regard to
environmental measures, their adoption depends on the good-faith judgement of the host state
without satisfying any necessity test. Secondly, the treaty counterbalances the protection afforded to
investors with a number of investment-based obligations. Obligations related to human rights,
corruption, corporate governance, environmental and social impact assessment further promote and
protect national interests and represent a new generation of regulatory instruments.
Thirdly, and most controversially, the BIT promotes the peaceful settlement of disputes through a
Joint Committee under art.26. Besides its seemingly flawed title, "disputes prevention", the provision
deals with investor–state disputes, yet the provision somehow refers to "disputes between the
Parties" and "a solution between the Parties", indicating that only states are covered. Above all, the
role of the investor in the whole Joint Committee exercise is neither clearly defined beyond the
possible participation in a "bilateral meeting", nor are the nature and legal significance of the
"assessment" of the dispute and "consultations and negotiations" defined. Furthermore, by placing
activation powers in the hands of the national state, art.26 undermines the essence of investor–state
disputes, which *I.C.C.L.R. 79 is mainly to insulate the process from political forces. It also seems
rather counterproductive to abandon direct negotiations between the investor and the host state as a
precondition for international arbitration in favour of Joint Committee proceedings. Furthermore, the
possible consolidation of investor–state and state–state disputes under art.29 is likely to produce
procedural difficulties.
Against that background, the BIT sets important lessons for other African countries on how to
redistribute rights and obligations between investors and the host state without harming investor
confidence to invest. For Morocco, it marks a departure from their recent intra-African BITs with Mali
in 2014, Guinea-Bissau in 2015 and Rwanda in 2016, which take a more traditional approach. In
those BITs, sustainability is not a predominant theme; they employ traditional fair and equitable
treatment opposed to the minimum standard of treatment and like circumstances are not delineated
or defined. On the other hand, Nigeria has very few recent intra-African BITs but has signed
agreements with countries, such as Canada in 2014, the United Arab Emirates in 2016 and
Singapore in 2016. These BITs apply the minimum standard of treatment and endorse the theme of
Page6
sustainability. For example, the Nigeria–Singapore BIT contains extensive provisions on the
environment, health and safety and corporate social responsibility—although not drafted as direct
obligations of foreign investors.36 However, the Morocco–Nigeria BIT departs significantly from these
BITs with more innovative provisions on the establishment of the Joint Committee, direct obligations
on investors and protection of national regulatory space. The innovative approaches taken in this BIT
are likely to spark similar considerations across the African continent but any reform action in this
direction is likely to remain intra-African for now.
Conclusion
The Morocco–Nigeria BIT, although not yet ratified by the parties, sends a clear signal to the rest of
the world that African countries have begun to embrace the new generation of investment treaties
and, therefore, are ready to charter a new course in their reform of the international investment
regime. Both Morocco and Nigeria have produced an instrument that can safeguard investors’
interests without compromising on national regulatory space or social values and it is expected to
enhance economic, social and environmental sustainability. However, on procedural matters, the
provisions on Joint Committee involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes and consolidation of
disputes present significant practical challenges that parties might consider addressing through a
protocol or other means. The BIT permits amendment at any time at the request of either state giving
the other party six months’ notice in writing (art.30).37 Whether the BIT is a step in the right direction is
difficult to tell at this stage but, once it is in force, the position would become much clearer. From the
assessment carried out in this article, it can be concluded that the BIT represents a new generation of
investment agreements with novel features. However, unless backed by a united Africa under the
CFTA or through a regional bloc, such novel provisions are unlikely to feature in BITs with *I.C.C.L.R.
80 capital exporting extra-African states. Nonetheless, the Morocco–Nigeria BIT provides an
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